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Access and collection of useƌs͛ data is ĐƌitiĐal iŶ the online marketing business. It has 
been argued that the accumulation of data that arises from concentrations, increases 
the likelihood of successful companies becoming dominant over their respective field. 
This raises the chance of them abusing their position in order to harm competition. 
This dissertation intends to contribute to the important discussion on the interface 
between data gathering and competition law in the context of the European Union. 
The paper aims at mapping and assessing various interplay possibilities between 
personal data and competition law. There are also references to the major cases that 
the European Commission has examined like Facebook - WhatsApp, Google - 
DoubleClick, TomTom -Tele Atlas, IMS Health case and Microsoft - Yahoo mergers. The 
assumption is that data accumulation has the potential to alter the dynamics of 
competition in a relevant market. In my opinion it is extremely possible under certain 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the merger cases that were investigated from a 
competition standpoint, show that many factors should be taken into account before 
reaching any conclusions.  
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ABSTRACT 
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This dissertation is an original, unpublished, independent intellectual product of the 
author, Gkoutzela Sofia Eirini except where references are made. The purpose of this 
paper is to introduce and demonstrate the connection between data gathering and 
implications on competition. The different cases on this subject are investigated and 
evaluated in order to provide the desirable results. This assumption that data 
accumulation may potentially distort competition is a very recent one with limited 
bibliography and that is why this paper will contribute to this investigation. This 
dissertation should be of interest to competition authorities, undertakings and 
consumers as well. This research was supported by the International Hellenic 
University as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commercial Law, 
Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law program. It was written under the supervision 
of Professor Emmanouela Trouli between August 2016 and February 2017. 
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Recent developments in technology introduced new ways of communication and 
ƌapidlǇ ĐhaŶged the iŶteƌŶet useƌs͛ conduct. The use of social media is an upcoming 
trend of the last few decades which is gradually expanding and invading every sector 
of our lives. The reasons why we use social media vary from staying up to date with 
current events and sharing opinions, to keeping in touch with friends or simply 
uploading photos1. However, we ignore the existence of a whole system behind every 
single action we do online, which has as only purpose to extract useful data in order to 
Đƌeate a useƌ͛s pƌofile. This pƌofile ǁill allow companies to gain huge profits from the 
user by simply offering him products he is susceptible to buying. More information, 
less time, access from any computer or network, unnoticeable process by the users are 
some of the characteristics of the undertakiŶgs͛ oŶliŶe tƌaĐkiŶg aĐtioŶ ǁhiĐh is 
happening everyday around the world. Whether this is harmful or beneficial to 
internet users, is not easy to say or prove. It has been noticed though, that the 
collection of data has a direct impact on competition between companies. Although at 
first sight data protection rules and competition rules do not serve the same purpose, 
they are nevertheless interdependent and parallel paths2, and this will be proven 
further below. This study focuses on how exactly data collection might potentially 
harm competition. ‘eĐeŶtlǇ Đƌeated ĐoŶĐepts like ͞data ŵiŶiŶg͟3 aŶd ͞ďig data͟4 will 
also concern us, as well as the most recent jurisprudence and legal framework on this 
matter. The aim of this study is to find out the influence that data collection has in 
economic activities and the implications on competition dimensions.5 It is known that 
                                                     
1
 Geoff DeĐƌeuŵauǆ, ͞The ϭϬ top ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ ǁe use soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks͟ Aǀailaďle at: 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/10-top-reasons-why-we-use-social-networks-geoff-desreumaux [18 May 2015] 
2
 Bertold Bar Bouyssiere, Daniel Colgan, Bram Vereecken, Competition law, big data and data protection - are 
Competition Authorities becoming jacks of all trades?,I Lexology. Lexology.com Available at: 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f9b02fe5-b8e1-4396-8efa-a24fffce9daf [July 18 2016]  
3
 MiĐhael J. A. BeƌƌǇ, GoƌdoŶ “. LiŶoff, ͞Data MiŶiŶg TeĐhŶiƋues: Foƌ MaƌketiŶg, “ales aŶd Custoŵeƌ ‘elatioŶship͟ 
4
 Ira Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning? New York University (NYU), Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2157659  [October 5, 2012] 
5
 ͞CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ aŶd Data͟, JoiŶt papeƌ oŶ data aŶd ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďǇ Autoƌité de la CoŶĐuƌƌeŶĐe aŶd 
Bundeskartellamt [10 May 2016] 
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data protection is enshrined in the TFEU6, but we seek to go a step further than that 
and take a closer look to the EU laws that tackle issues of anti-competitive behavior 
that derive from illegal data collection.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 "Protection of Personal Data - European Commission". Ec.europa.eu. N.p., 2016. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/  [21 Dec. 2016] 
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1.1 Big data and Personal data 
 
Digital commerce is a rapidly developing invention of the last decades that is 
gaining gradually a huge market share. In order for this market to function properly, 
crucial volumes of information must be carefully collected and processed. These 
distinct pieces of information which exist basically everywhere on the internet and are 
usually stoƌed iŶ oŶliŶe ǁaƌehouses aƌe ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ kŶoǁŶ as ͞data͟. Data collection is 
the most essential part of this business as there is no personal contact with the 
customers.  The so-Đalled ͞ďig data͟ has ƌeĐeŶtlǇ ďeĐoŵe a ǀeƌǇ hot topiĐ foƌ 
competition authorities.7 Both Big Data and personal data are collected constantly 
online by search engines and online undertakings. Their difference is that Big Data may 
involve personal data (e.g. names, addresses, contact details).  
The digital revolution has inevitably rendered personal data a commodity. The 
needs and preferences of consumers, that are known through data collection, enhance 
competition for goods and services. So, personal data serve a dual purpose. They are 
both a commodity that undertakings acquire and sell, and also an input capable of 
raising barriers to entry in a relevant market.8 
Big Data gathering creates new challenges for competition economists every 
day that they cannot ignore. Many notions like the market and its power or the 
competitive agreements and effects, have to be redefined and examined thoroughly. 
Economists believe that the collection and use of big data may easily raise entry 
barriers. Obviously, the firms would be more than willing to use this source of market 
                                                     
7
 Thomas Oster,  Jörg Witting , ͞FƌeŶĐh aŶd GeƌŵaŶ ĐoŵpetitioŶ authoƌities puďlish joiŶt papeƌ oŶ data aŶd 
ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ͟ Aǀailaďle at: https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2016/global/french-and-german-
competition-authorities-publish-paper-on-data-and-competition-law [23 May 2016] 
8
 FƌaŶĐisĐo Costa, Caďƌal, Oƌla LǇŶskeǇ ͞The iŶteƌŶal aŶd eǆteƌŶal ĐoŶstƌaiŶts of data pƌoteĐtioŶ oŶ competition law 
iŶ the EU͟, L“E [ϮϬϭϱ] 
1. Data gathering and processing 
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power in order to damage their competitors. Furthermore, big data can reinforce 
market transparency and thus facilitate collusion.9 
Sooner or later, data ownership issues may arise as well. For example, if a 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ oǁŶs a peƌsoŶ͛s ŵediĐal histoƌǇ it ŵaǇ pƌohiďit the Đoŵpetitoƌs͛ entry into a 
medical services market. In USA, pharmaceutical companies use databases of patients 
and doctors to find out information which will make them competitive to the drug 
market.10 
Another change that big data gathering can cause is increased price 
transparency. The Commission states in its Preliminary Report that price monitoring 
software may facilitate or strengthen collusion and thereby impact competition.11 
The competition authorities are keeping a close eye on big data, in an effort to 
keep pace with the development of the real economy. A prohibition on data collection 
would be illegal, especially now that the majority of online businesses absorb their 
power from that. Furthermore, data collection is based on so many different and 
unexpected sources that has become almost impossible to control. Besides, such a 
prohibition would be harmful for the consumers as they benefit the most from 
receiving the appropriate results and more targeted advertisements.  
As for Personal Data, they too are considered a potential new class of economic 
assets strategically used by online service providers. The economic significance of 
Personal Data was not considered a topic of great importance, yet now it started 
becoming subject of discussions in order to find the interface between them and 
competition issues.12 The problem that arises here is that there is suspicion among 
consumers on how their personal information is used when uploaded. In almost every 
country there are laws prohibiting the exploitation of personal data and their 
distribution to third parties for commercial purposes.13 The EU provides the highest 
                                                     
9
 Bertold Bar Bouyssiere, Daniel Colgan, Bram Vereecken, Competition law, big data and data protection - are 
Competition Authorities becoming jacks of all trades?,I Lexology. Lexology.com Available at: 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f9b02fe5-b8e1-4396-8efa-a24fffce9daf [July 18 2016] 
10
 Mike “aueƌŵaŶ, ͞ϯ ǁaǇs of gatheƌiŶg data ǁithout iŶǀadiŶg ĐoŶsuŵeƌ pƌiǀaĐǇ͟ Aǀailaďle at: 
https://www.visioncritical.com/data-gathering-ethics/ [30 July 2013] 
11
 Chaƌles BaŶkes, Ajit KeŶth, ͞Commission identifies business practices that might restrict competition and limit 
consumer choice in its Preliminary Report on e-ĐoŵŵeƌĐe͟, EleǆiĐa.Đoŵ Aǀailaďle at: 
http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/antitrust-and-merger-control/22-commission-identifies-business-
practices-that-might-restrict-competition [23 Sep. 2016] 
12
 Olga Batuƌa, ͞IŶteƌfaĐe ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ aŶd peƌsoŶal data: ĐhalleŶges aŶd possiďilities͟ [Ϯ JuŶe ϮϬϭϲ] 
13
 ͞CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ aŶd Data͟, JoiŶt papeƌ oŶ data aŶd ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďǇ Autoƌité de la CoŶĐuƌƌeŶĐe aŶd 
Bundeskartellamt [10 May 2016] 
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data protection standards in the world and this generates trust to EU citizens.14 So 
finally, personal data collection may be advantageous to one undertaking but harmful 
to all its competitors who cannot have access to the same kind of information. 
The digitalization of everything has made data a competitive issue as well. 
Sometimes companies are using data to control access to market and the competitors 
protest against such behavior or abuse of dominant position from a firm. The issue of 
ownership of data comes to make things more complex. And yet the question remains: 
who can claim to be the owner of data?15  Facebook for example, prevents other 
undertakings from taking advantage of its data, establishing some kind of ownership.16 
And it is absolutely logical in this battle where undertakings are competing for users, 
ads and high revenues, to be reluctant to share precious data. 
 
1.2 Ways of collecting data 
Since the advancement of technology is so rapidly expanding around the world 
and the world itself is transforming, our lives are bound to follow this wave of change. 
And as the users are spending more and more of their time on electronic devices such 
as laptops, tablets and mobiles, they constantly increase the amount of information 
they provide to lurking companies.  
While the traditional techniques of data collection are interviews, 
questionnaires, surveys, observations, focus groups, documents and records, 
technology has now offered us the possibility of collecting data in an easier and more 
effective way. The modern way of collecting data includes online or web-based 
surveys, clickers and PDAs (personal digital assistants), text messages and of course 
social networking sites such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook. 
The internet offers an environment with a huge variety of options through 
which data can be collected. Online service providers are aware of the benefits and 
                                                     
14
 ͞The EU data pƌoteĐtioŶ ƌefoƌŵ aŶd Big Data͟, EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ [Maƌ. ϮϬϭϲ] 
15
 Philippe RiŶĐazauǆ, ͞Hoǁ EU CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ Applies To Data ColleĐtioŶ Issues͟ Aǀailaďle at: 
https://www.law360.com/articles/449311/how-eu-competition-law-applies-to-data-collection-issues [18 June 
2013] 
16
 IŶge Gƌaef, “ih YuliaŶa WahǇuŶiŶgtǇas, PeggǇ ValĐke, ͞AssessiŶg Data AĐĐess Issues iŶ OŶliŶe Platfoƌŵs͟ Aǀailaďle 
at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2647309 [19 Aug. 2015] 
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influence of the online community.17 They also consider the acquisition of data a 
necessity in order to attract more customers and that is why they use multiple tools to 
gather them.18 The most popular ways of collecting data are social networks, online 
surveys and search engines.  
Social networks are like an ocean of information voluntarily provided by the 
users with every single post, comment, or conversation. One of their basic advantages 
is that a large number of participants can be easily reached in minimum time. 
Concurrently, social media offer even the slightest details of their beliefs, attitudes and 
actions, allowing the person who delves into these data to basically predict their 
thoughts and moves.19 And although Facebook seems to be the most obvious source 
of information, researches have shown that YouTube viewers and bloggers can absorb 
more essential information and reach conclusions more easily.20 This is proof that data 
can be found in the most unimaginable corners of the web by every single action of the 
users. 
Another commonly known way to collect data is through online surveys. This is 
a whole new system which offers numerous possibilities of designing each survey 
accordingly to the needs of the company that distributes it and the kind of information 
it aims to extract. Various surveys even offer a remuneration in order to attract a 
ďiggeƌ audieŶĐe. OŶliŶe platfoƌŵs suĐh as ͞“uƌǀeǇ Gizŵo͟ aŶd ͞“uƌǀeǇ MoŶkeǇ͟, the 
so-called survey providers, have made it possible for everyone to launch a survey 
promising an effective collection of the information needed.21 The advantages of 
                                                     
17
 JasoŶ BoǁdeŶ, ͞“oĐial Media APIs aŶd data ĐolleĐtioŶ stƌategies͟, BusiŶess Ϯ CoŵŵuŶitǇ, Aǀailaďle at: 
http://www.business2community.com/social-media/social-media-apis-data-collection-strategies-0887426 [20 May 
2014] 
18
 Damien Geradin, Monica KusĐheǁskǇ, ͞CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ aŶd PeƌsoŶal Data: PƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ Thoughts oŶ a Coŵpleǆ 
Issue͟ Aǀailaďle at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2216088 [12 Feb. 2013] 
19
 ͞Social Media Data Collection – IŶsights You CaŶ Use͟, “ŶaptƌeŶds. N.p., ϮϬϭϲ, Aǀailaďle at: 
http://snaptrends.com/social-media-software/data-collection/  
20
 Heather Fletcher, 8 Best PƌaĐtiĐes foƌ ColleĐtiŶg Data fƌoŵ “oĐial Netǁoƌks, ͞Data ŵiŶiŶg oŶ soĐial Ŷetǁoƌks foƌ 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌ iŶsights͟, Taƌget MaƌketiŶg, Aǀailaďle at: http://www.targetmarketingmag.com/article/data-mining-
social-networking-sites-consumer-insights/all/  [21 Dec.2016] 
21
 “Đheƌeƌ “iŶa, ͞Hoǁ to ĐolleĐt data effeĐtiǀelǇ? AŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ of the ďest oŶliŶe suƌǀeǇ pƌoǀideƌs͟,  JEP“ BulletiŶ, 
Available at: http://blog.efpsa.org/2013/11/15/how-to-collect-data-effectively-an-overview-of-the-best-online-
survey-providers/ [15 Nov. 2013] 
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reduced cost, higher response rates and lack of geographical boundaries22 have made 
the online surveys a very popular way of collecting data.  
Finally, everybody can admit that the use of the internet is totally linked to the 
use of search engines.  Google is gathering even more information than most of us 
realize in order to become more personalized to the specific needs of its users.23 This 
aĐtioŶ kŶoǁŶ as ͞spideƌiŶg͟ is a ƌeleŶtless pƌoĐess, ǁhiĐh ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith the use of 
algorithms is able to display to users the websites and information that the search 
engine has selected itself.24 In fact this is exactly what users expect to receive when 
they are searching online. It is rather obvious that search engines are designed to meet 
the useƌs͛ eǆpeĐtatioŶs aŶd pƌoǀide theŵ ǁith ƌesults ƌeleǀaŶt to theŵ.  
In order to determine the importance of data collection we must firstly 
understand the way the search engines work. They provide free services which are 
funded through online advertising. So, it is very important that the advertisements 
that appeaƌ iŶ the useƌ͛s sĐƌeeŶ aƌe Ŷot oŶlǇ ƌelevant, but also appealing and 
proportionate to his income. People tend to be hard adjudicators for something that is 
free, and as there is no price to influence their decision, they will probably end up to 
the search engine that meets their expectations as mentioned above.
 25
 
Consequently, data are collected not only when users make online purchases, 
but also when they search something in the web. Other clues like the country or the 
exact location of a person, his interests, his marital status and everything else are also 
available to those undertakings who seek to enhance ad targeting and present more 
qualified products to their customers.26 
To sum up, the information that is usually collected is extending to every single 
ĐliĐk of the useƌ͛s keǇďoaƌd. From name, address and e mail, to details like 
subscriptions in YouTube channels and google search history, every piece of 
                                                     
22
 Baƌďaƌa O Neil, ͞ColleĐtiŶg ‘eseaƌĐh Data OŶliŶe: IŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ EǆteŶsioŶ PƌofessioŶals͟, Aǀailaďle at: 
https://www.joe.org/joe/2004june/tt1.php [June 2004] 
23
 ͞Hoǁ Google ĐolleĐts data aďout Ǉou aŶd the IŶteƌŶet – PiŶgdoŵ ‘oǇal͟, Aǀailaďle at: 
http://royal.pingdom.com/2010/01/08/how-google-collects-data-about-you-and-the-internet/ [8 Jan. 2010] 
24
 ͞Hoǁ seaƌĐh eŶgiŶes ǁoƌk - The BasiĐs of “eaƌĐh EŶgiŶe OptiŵizatioŶ͟, Pallasart, Pallasweb.com, Available at: 
https://www.pallasweb.com/search-engines.html [22 Dec. 2016] 
25
 DaŵieŶ GeƌadiŶ, MoŶiĐa KusĐheǁskǇ, ͞CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ aŶd PeƌsoŶal Data: PƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ Thoughts oŶ a Coŵpleǆ 
Issue͟, Aǀailaďle at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2216088  [12 Feb. 2013] 
26
 ͞CoŵpetitioŶ Laǁ aŶd Data͟, JoiŶt papeƌ oŶ data aŶd ĐoŵpetitioŶ ďǇ Autoƌité de la CoŶĐuƌƌeŶĐe aŶd 
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information is precious for the ĐoŵpaŶies. TheǇ iŶǀestigate eǀeƌǇ useƌ͛s actions 
thoroughly in order to determine the results they will provide him in the future27 and 
make sure they will meet his expectations. Frequently, information is given voluntarily 
by the users, whereas other times an observation and tracking process of surfing 
habits is needed in order to gather the data the companies seek to find. Alternatively, 
they can even use data that others have collected previously or run surveys.28 Of 
course, there are platforms that require online registration and promise to keep the 
useƌ͛s data seĐƌet, like LiŶkedIŶ foƌ eǆaŵple. Hoǁeǀer, if the user decides to make his 
data public, then there is no restriction and no matter of illegality into collecting 
them.29 
 
1.3 The objectives of competition law 
The existence of competition in the market is essential, as it puts businesses 
under constant pressure to offer high quality products at the lowest possible prices for 
consumers. So, competition policy is necessary in order to impose rules which will 
make sure undertakings compete fairly with each other, otherwise they will probably 
try to limit competition. The two fundamental European competition law provisions 
are articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU and all undertakings should act in conformity with 
the competition rules contained in this text. I f a problem arises, the European 
Commission has inspection and enforcement powers in its possession, that allows it to 
prevent or correct anti-competitive behavior and preserve the well-functioning of the 
competition in the market. However, the interpretation of these two articles is quite 
difficult even for antitrust experts. In most cases the behavior of a firm is characterized 
as distortive for competition at first sight. The challenge is to find out if it really falls 
into the scope of 101 or 102 TFEU by measuring all the relevant circumstances.
30
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 Kate Torgovnick May, ͞What data is ďeiŶg ĐolleĐted oŶ Ǉou? “oŵe shoĐkiŶg iŶfo͟, Available at: 
http://blog.ted.com/what-data-is-being-collected-on-you-some-shocking-info/ [July 24, 2012] 
28
 ͞The ĐoŵŵeƌĐial use of ĐoŶsuŵeƌ data͟, Report on the CMA͛s Đall foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ 
29
 ͞ColleĐtiŶg data fƌoŵ the ǁeď - Is it legal͟, The ‘elatioŶship MappiŶg Blog, Aǀailaďle at: 
https://prospectvisual.wordpress.com/2014/12/16/collecting-data-from-the-web-is-it-legal-2/ [16 Dec. 2016] 
30
 European Commission, DG Competition 
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2.1 Rules protecting competition law and connection with the acquisition of data - 
reference to anti-competitive tactics 
 
EU competition law is located in the core of the vision for the creation of a 
single market. The European Union has made sure that competition rules serve the 
internal market and its integration and promise to improve the dynamic efficiency of 
the European economy.31 Many reforms, such as the removal of nontariff barriers and 
the liberalization of services, served the purpose of increasing competition. It is rather 
obvious that the bigger the competition is, the bigger the benefits for European 
consumers are. In the aftermath, the Internal Market offers everyday wider choices 
and lower prices to EU citizens.32 
Perhaps one of the most prominent topics during the last years is the interface 
between data protection and antitrust law.33 EU competition law has obviously placed 
limits on the acquisition and processing of personal data. That means that the matter 
of data collection concerns the legislators in association with the possibility of anti-
competitive behavior. So, in order to find out the interface between personal data and 
competition law, we should start from the fundamental rules of the TFEU that protect 
the consumers from restrains to competition.  
We should focus then in the articles 101 and 102 TFEU which are the 
cornerstones of competition law. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between two 
or more independent market operators which restrict competition, whereas 102 TFEU 
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the market area. The European 
Commission has the authority to investigate cases of breach and impose fines where it 
considers there is a violation of antitrust laws.34  
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Generally, the existence of competition is considered a positive aspect in the 
world of market because it means innovation, efficiency, quality products and reduced 
prices. An anti-competitive practice consequently, is intended to restrict, distort or 
prevent competition.35 And it is absolutely logical that the companies fear the 
existence of competitors, as to them it means less profits.  
Undertakings always keep in mind that they must find ways to exterminate 
their rivals. The anti-competitive practices vary according to the situation but the sure 
thing is the list is huge. Indicatively, tacit collusion, predatory pricing, price fixing, bid 
rigging, mergers and acquisitions36 are some of the most typical practices that the 
companies use in order to distort competition. 
When it comes to exploiting online data, the corporate strategies are extremely 
abundant as well. Mergers, refusal to access and exclusive contracts are considered 
common tactics for exterminating competitors.37 Moreover, the acquisition of 
personal data itself is an act which raises barriers to entry in the market. It is like a 
perpetual circle, starting from acquiring data and targeted advertising, which brings 
high revenues. This offers the possibility to finance bigger investments and finally it 
leads to more customers that provide the company with even more data and so on.38 
Furthermore, it is believed that data gathering facilitates price discrimination in a way 
that ŵoŶitoƌiŶg useƌs͛ haďits alloǁs ĐoŵpaŶies to pƌediĐt the aŵouŶt of ŵoŶeǇ that 
the users are willing to spent on a specific product and thus they offer the same 
product in different prices depending on each specific customer.39 
The above mentioned are some of the multiple uses of data that play an 
important role in the marketing sector. Therefore, it seems that data gathering has a 
direct impact on competition, as it may put new entrants in a difficult position if they 
are unable to access these valuable data (acquisition of personal data through exclusivity 
agreements). Eventually smaller rivals will cease to exist as they have been deprived 
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from this asset. Even in the case where a new entrant has access to data, it will 
probably take him a long time to gather them and in the meantime the users will 
revert to their old source of products or information.40 And to understand how serious 
this situation is, we should consider that it may gradually allow the creation of 
monopolies or dominant companies, leading to an increase in prices or cartels. The 
various ways of exploiting data in order to distort competition are analyzed further 
below. 
 
 
2.2  Data related anticompetitive conducts 
2.2.1 Agreements that restrict competition 
 
More specifically, one of the best ways to acquire data through anti-
competitive means and prevent competitors from doing the same, is to sign exclusive 
agreements. The legality of these agreements depends on a variety of factors and thus 
should be investigated in each case separately.41 The sure thing is that personal data 
are increasingly becoming a necessary input to provide certain online services42 and 
seƌǀiĐe pƌoǀideƌs suƌelǇ take adǀaŶtage of that. Google͛s ĐoŶduĐt duƌiŶg the last 
decades is the perfect example of such anti-competitive behavior.  
 European Commission suspects that Google has entered into exclusive 
agreements with popular websites and advertising services, hence excluding its 
competitors from acquiring the same volume of data. Furthermore, Google also signed 
exclusive toolbar and distribution agreements with Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari and 
Opera, weakening its rivals even more so it can become a dominant player in the 
market. Commission estimates that this limitation on access will probably give Google 
a competitive advantage against other search engines.43 This is a brief reference to the 
Google case, but we will analyze it further below in a unique chapter. 
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Generally, another ordinary way to distort competition is when undertakings 
decide to make some sort of arrangement which leads to a secret agreement.  This 
agreement can include one or various factors like prices, production and customers. 
The economic consequences of this type of agreements vary according to how exactly 
the parties have agreed to act. Indicatively, they can cause an increase in prices 
(cartels or collusion) if there is a price fixing involved, or they may restrict new 
undertakings from entering the market. The agreements may be written and signed or 
just oral. In both cases the process of detecting them is extremely difficult and 
complicated for competition authorities.44 However, the European Commission has the 
appropriate investigative and inspectional powers in order to unravel such potential 
agreements and impose fines accordingly.45 Besides, the article 101 TFEU explicitly 
prohibits agreements with anticompetitive object or those which have the potential of 
inflicting damage on competition.46 
Of course, not all agreements between companies are illegal or injurious to 
competition, as long as they do not breach article 101 TFEU. This means that some 
kind of agreements may be advantageous for the market if they facilitate the 
advancement of technology or the convenience of EU citizens. Sometimes it is even 
necessary that the firms exchange ideas, statistics or information about their 
customers in order to develop and adapt in the market or invent new innovative 
products. Subject to the discretion of the competent authorities (European 
Commission), agreements between undertakings may be considered legal after all, if it 
has been proved that they do not involve price fixing or other practices that restrict 
competition. 
To sum up there is a thin line separating not only agreements that do harm 
competition and those which do not, but also agreements that are beneficial to users 
and those that are harmful. Generally, exclusive agreements cannot be characterized 
as the most imminent danger for competition, whereas other tactics like collusion, 
price fixing agreements, market sharing agreements are more obvious cases that 
threaten to disturb the functioning of competition. The gathering of big data can surely 
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create significant competitive advantage and drive innovation and growth47, but when 
it is combined with agreements between companies then it creates a dilemma. Do the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages or not? Additionally, when accusing 
undertakings for anti-competitive behavior, the authorities should make sure that the 
uŶdeƌtakiŶgs͛ aĐtioŶs haǀe Đaused suĐh sufficient degree of harm to competition, that 
can support the accusation. 
 
2.2.2 Price discrimination, excessive pricing and privacy policies 
 
Another case where data and competition meet is when companies sell 
ideŶtiĐal goods oƌ seƌǀiĐes at diffeƌeŶt pƌiĐes, the so Đalled ͞pƌiĐe disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ͟. It is 
quite obvious that data gathering aŶd oďseƌǀatioŶ of the Đustoŵeƌs͛ heteƌogeŶeitǇ can 
facilitate price discrimination and help firms reach their goal, which is to capture the 
ŵaƌket͛s ĐoŶsuŵeƌ suƌplus. When a company owns personal data such as age, sex, 
economic status and location, it is easy to set prices based on this information and 
acquire several satisfied customers.  The effects of this technique however cannot be 
characterized neither positive nor negative. On the one hand, it causes an unfair 
breach on consumer equality, but on the other hand it improves social welfare by 
increasing the number of transactions. In the end, price discrimination seems to be 
beneficial for both companies and consumers, as low-paid people can have access to 
wider choices of goods, and undertakings are able to set their prices according to the 
willingness of their customers to buy a specific product.48 
Price discrimination though, has been unduly accused of distorting 
competition. Nevertheless, the effects of price discrimination are various, complex and 
highly dependent on the relevant market in which firms operate, and that is why we 
cannot say for sure if it harms competition or not. Many factors should be taken into 
account before reaching a conclusion such as the relevant market, the consumer 
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demand, if there is a dominant undertaking involved or if it is trying to abuse its 
position by using this technique of price discrimination.49 
Another similar matter that alarms the competition authorities is excessive 
pricing. Data accumulation and processing, may give the opportunity to a dominant 
firm to set prices significantly higher than those which would result from effective 
competition.50 The fact that a single undertaking can fix the prices of specific products 
can turn out to be distortive to competition and investment. It may also set barriers to 
entry in the market extremely high for new undertakings. Here we have a paradox. 
Generally, antitrust and competition law tries to offer the lowest possible prices to 
consumers.51 However, a possible intervention from the authorities with the purpose 
of combating excessive pricing by regulating prices, would be further distortive for 
competition as it would destroy investment incentives. There is a belief that the 
problem will typically solve itself, since high profits will encourage new entrants in the 
market, and that is why there is almost no intervention by the EU.52 
Another matter that we need to take into consideration is privacy policies. The 
interplay between privacy reductions from a dominant company, which seeks to 
control huge volumes of data, and competition, has to be examined from a 
competition angle. These reductions might possibly be a case of abuse when a 
company collects data by clearly breaching data protection law.53 Therefore privacy 
policies should be examined as they may be able to affect competition. However, in 
the faŵous Đase ͚FaĐeďook/WhatsApp͟ the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ ƌuled that ͞Any 
privacy related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within the 
control of Facebook, do not fall within the scope of the EU Competition law rules but 
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within the scope of the EU data protection rules͟54. So, it seems that there is a thin line 
separating these two sectors and that the boundary is not always distinct. 
 
2.2.3 Abuse of dominant position 
 
There is a belief that the mere existence of a dominant company hinders the 
competition in a market and therefore it has a special responsibility to ensure that 
competition will not be undermined. Through the Treaty of the Functioning of EU, the 
objective of ensuring the functioning of an undistorted system of competition was 
successful.  Under 102 TFEU, any exploitation of a dominant position should be 
regarded as abusive if it distorts competition. Consequently, the European Commission 
considers that the monopolization of a market due to a concentration of undertakings, 
can be characterized as abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 102 
TFEU.55 
Certainly, the law does not prohibit a dominant position as such, but it places 
restrictions on its possible behavior, because it may lead to competition distortion if it 
is combined with abusive practices. This practically means that the decisive factor here 
is the accumulated market power which poses a threat, and actions that would 
otherwise be permitted, are prohibited in order to prevent a potential harm to 
competition.56  Furthermore, a necessary step in order to characterize a behavior as 
anti-competitive is to define the relevant market.57 Unfortunately 102 TFEU does not 
provide us with a definition of what exactly is a dominant position probably because it 
is rather difficult to describe. However, it giǀes eǆaŵples of ͚aďusiǀe pƌaĐtiĐe͛ suĐh as 
a) imposing unfair prices or other unfair trading conditions, b) limiting production, c) 
applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions or d) imposing supplementary 
obligations in order to sign a contract.58 
In order to understand the notion of abuse of dominant position, a definition 
can be found in the famous case United Brands v Commission: ͞A position of economic 
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strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers͟.59 In any case, the Commission investigates both horizontal and 
nonhorizontal cases60 and tries to discover potential antitrust issues raised by big data 
when a concentration is taking place between companies that own great data 
volumes.61 
ColleĐtiŶg data suƌelǇ ĐaŶ stƌeŶgtheŶ a fiƌŵ͛s doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ oƌ eǀeŶ Đƌeate 
a powerful firm able to set prices above the competitive level or sell products of an 
inferior quality. The most recent example of the Facebook/WhatsApp deal shows that 
the European Commission is investigating whether data accumulation by this 
dominant company would have potential foreclosure effects for its competitors.62  
 Breach of data protection laws could, in some cases, also amount to an abuse 
of a dominant position. This could be a matter of abuse control if an incumbent 
collects data by clearly breaching data protection law and if there is a strong interplay 
ďetǁeeŶ the data ĐolleĐtioŶ aŶd the uŶdeƌtakiŶg͛s ŵaƌket positioŶ.63 The AstraZeneca 
case falls exactly into this type of abuse as its corporate strategies distorted 
competition in the pharmaceutical sector. 64. The ECJ eŶdoƌsed the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ϮϬϬϱ 
infringement decision and accused the company for abusive and restrictive for 
competition practices.65  
IŶ the ͞peƌsoŶal data ŵaƌket͟, it is stƌoŶglǇ ďelieǀed that ǁheŶ a doŵiŶaŶt 
company refuses access to necessary data to its competitors, then it is abusing its 
position. Sometimes the competitors try to gain access by filing a complaint to the 
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authorities and demanding to oblige the dominant firm to provide the data.66 
However, it is highly unlikely that the Commission would impose such a measure 
unless the specific data are essential and not substitutable for the other market 
players.67 
 
2.2.4 Mergers and acquisitions 
 
There is an ongoing debate across Europe on the interaction between 
competition, data protection and consumer protection law. The sure thing is that in 
the digital economy all the above-mentioned affect one another and sometimes a 
small change in one of them could relatively influence the course of the others. 
Especially in cases of mergers and acquisitions, data protection can be very relevant 
from a competition standpoint and that is why merger control is an additional concern 
of the EU. However, it seems that the European Commission has so far been reluctant 
to consider data protection issues in competition cases.68 
Yet, merger control remains the most important testing ground for the 
influence of data protection on competition.69 In any case, an undertaking can 
obviously gain a powerful position through a merger. With so much market power 
accumulated in one single firm, no one can predict what it is capable of and what could 
be the consequences of its actions.70 Obviously, there is a thin line that a dominant 
firm can easily cross and adopt a policy that will result to the restriction of 
competition. Through the process of a merger, an already dominant company probably 
aims at accumulating even more market power through the collection of more 
consumer data and privacy degradation.71 In 2012, former EU Competition 
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Commissioner Almunia acknowledged that ͚a single dominant company could of course 
think to infringe privacy laws to gain an advantage over its competitors͛.72 
The situation gets more serious when this dominant undertaking merges with 
another in order to gain access to a huge amount of data and thus becoming a colossal 
player in the market that none of its competitors would be able to outrun. Company 
mergers, by concentration or acquisition, can obviously create or strengthen a 
dominant position which may give rise to abuse. The combination of two or more 
firms, although it is something that happens more than frequently nowadays, it can 
transform the market in a way that some companies may even face financial disaster. 
When a company acquires a competitor-company, it hopes to reduce expenses 
and combine their market power. This, practically means that the company that 
emerges from the merger, has in its disposal combined knowledge and a volume of 
data capable of gaining an even larger piece of the audience of possible customers. At 
this point, complaints will probably be raised by competitors and privacy advocates, in 
order to prevent a future situation where they will have to confront a dominant 
undertaking. 
We must also understand that there is a close connection between a 
͞suspiĐious͟ ŵeƌgeƌ aŶd a ĐoŵpaŶǇ iŶ a doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ that tƌies to take 
advantage of that through strategic decisions. Especially in the cases where the 
merging companies are already dominant players, the merger becomes even more 
suspicious. The decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the European 
Commission, about the controversial merger cases of 
Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp are the best example in order to 
understand this type of infringement to competition.73 There will be a thorough 
analysis of these two cases further below. 
Surely the case of a merger or acquisition might fall within the scope of article 102 
TFEU if it creates a matter of dominant position in the market which will later lead to 
abusive practices. Every concentration beyond certain threshold is necessarily notified 
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to the Commission,74 which is granted with the exclusive power to investigate these 
agreements and grant its approval or not. If it is alleged that a merger will distort 
competition, then EU allows it only under the condition of complying with a series of 
commitments aimed at preserving competition in the relevant market.75 If the 
concentration seems capable of significantly impeding competition, then the 
Commission will do anything to remove competitive constraints on the merged entity, 
in order for the merger to be accomplished. 
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3.1 Google - DoubleClick merger 
 
In April 2008, Google has announced its volition to proceed to the acquisition of 
Double Click, which is a developer and provider of Internet ad serving services. Double 
Click obviously is based on data collection through cookies, IP addresses or business 
rules set by its clients. This merger is considered one of the biggest investments Google 
has made and was expected to generate higher revenues. 
After thorough investigation, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)76 gave its 
approval to Google in order to carry on with the controversial merger. As it was 
expected, Google͛s rivals, such as Microsoft and Yahoo, have challenged the merger, 
complaining that it would give the merged entity an unfair advantage in search and 
publisher-based advertising tools.77 Moreover, Google would gain access to a huge 
amount of data that Double Click had in its possession and since it is considered a 
dominant player, it was possible to adopt an anti-competitive behavior in the future.  
EƌiĐ “Đhŵidt, Google's ĐhaiƌŵaŶ aŶd CEO, deĐlaƌed that ͞the acquisition poses 
no risk to competition and will benefit consumers" hoping that the European 
Commission will adopt the FTC decision and consent to the expensive deal of $3.1 
billion. Whether this acquisition will benefit the users or not, depended on the Google 
policy after the merger. When done properly, advertising can be useful to users and 
provide them with relevant information for services or products. But when it serves 
only the purpose to yield profits to the company, then abuse practices that threaten to 
distort the healthy competition may be used.78 However Eric Schmidt made clear that 
the company will not change its course, its policy and the ways it makes investments. 
The acquisition was expected to have many positive effects and bring to 
market, advances in technology and infrastructure. It is an agreement made not only 
for profit, but in the hope to deliver more relevant ads for consumers, more choices 
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for advertisers, and more opportunities for website publishers. Eric Schmidt assured 
the FTC and the European Commission that "This merger will dramatically improve the 
effectiveness, measurability and performance of digital media for publishers, 
advertisers and agencies, while improving the relevance of advertising for users". 79 
It seems that FTC was convinced and gave the green light for the merger. The 
arguments that finally led FTC to the decision of allowing Google – Double Click merger 
were basically 3. Firstly, the two companies were not direct competitors, secondly 
there are multiple players in the advertising service market that competition is not 
only safe, but it is likely to become fiercer, and lastly Double Click lacks market power 
in the ad market, so it is unlikely to give to Google such an advantage capable of 
distorting competition.80 
The European Commission however, was not satisfied enough in order to let 
Google proceed with the deal, and decided to take a deeper look on this case. It 
seemed concerned about the merger's impact on competition in the online advertising 
space and potential subsequent harm to consumers.81 There was a thought that the 
combination of Google and DoubleClick might allow the two companies to combine 
their different methods of data gathering. In the online world, data collection surely is 
the powering force of a company and if used wisely it can damage its competitors by 
foreclosing them from being able to challenge the dominant player. 
Finally, after thorough investigation the European Commission came to the 
conclusion that the two merging companies operate in different parts of the online 
advertising world and since they cannot be considered as competitors, their deal poses 
no threat to competition.82 Furthermore, the combined data that the merged entity 
will possess, does not provide a competitive advantage because its competitors have 
access to similar information as they are available from Internet service providers.83 
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The problematic in this case was whether the accumulation of data to a 
dominant player like Google would lead to abusive practices and barriers to entry 
would be so high that no company could stand a chance if entering the market.84 
Moreover, a question has been posed on whether Google is impeding data portability 
in order to foreclose the market to potential competitors. Having defined the relevant 
markets which are actually two, the online advertising intermediation market and the 
ad serving market, and having reached the conclusion that DoubleClick is not a 
dangerous dominant player, the chances of Google using combined data in order to 
distort competition and harm the consumers, was highly unlikable.85  
 
3.2 Microsoft - Yahoo case 
 
In 2007 Microsoft, which was an undoubted dominant market player in the 
relatively new and dynamic market of online search, made an effort to acquire Yahoo 
in order to expand its online business and compete more effectively with Google.86 
This acquisition probably attracted the attention of both American and European 
competition authorities. 
Their agreement included Microsoft becoming the exclusive search advertising 
pƌoǀideƌ used ďǇ Yahoo, aŶd Yahoo͛s Đustoŵeƌs ǁould ďe ŵigƌated from Panama (the 
previous adǀeƌtisiŶg platfoƌŵͿ to MiĐƌosoft͛s adǀeƌtisiŶg platfoƌŵ (new advertising 
platform), ŵeaŶiŶg that Yahoo ǁould eǆĐlusiǀelǇ use MiĐƌosoft͛s seaƌĐh eŶgiŶe fƌoŵ 
now on. 
The European Commission examined this case under the thought that this is a 
serious merger that will lead in a concentration from three to two players in a market 
where barriers to entry are already high. Therefore, competition issues may arise. The 
Commission tried to find the relevant market, then made an assumption on the 
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ŵaƌket͛s eǀolutioŶ ǁithout the ŵeƌgeƌ aŶd fiŶallǇ assessed the iŵpaĐt of the 
transaction for advertisers, users and distributors.87  
 This merger surely can promote innovation in the online advertising market 
and simultaneously fulfill the needs of customers and publishers.88 The combination of 
data from Yahoo and Microsoft would iŶĐƌease the seaƌĐh eŶgiŶe͛s aďilitǇ to pƌoǀide 
relevant search results to users and of course attract a larger number of advertisers. 
Finally, the question Commission posed is whether this deal will eventually benefit 
competition and consumers or not. 
It seems that the result of the investigation has shown that this deal would 
allow Microsoft and Yahoo to compete effectively with Google and thus benefit the 
advertising sector and the online search service market. Furthermore, a greater scale 
of data collection can provide assistance to Microsoft in order to exert pressure on 
Google.89  Possibilities to use combined data in order to hamper competition was a 
highly unlikable scenario. Therefore, the acquisition may deprive the market of an 
important competitor but at the same time it will boost Microsoft in order to compete 
effectively with the dominant player which is Google. So, it looks like a win-win deal 
fƌoŵ the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s ǀieǁpoiŶt and that is why it decided not to oppose the 
operation and to declare it compatible with the common market.90 
 
3.3 Facebook WhatsApp merger 
 
After careful investigation on the markets of communications services, social 
networking services, and online advertising services, the European Commission has 
authorized, under the EU Merger Regulation, the proposed acquisition of WhatsApp by 
Facebook in 2014. 
The Commission found that Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp are not close 
competitors (maybe distant ones because it has not been clarified if WhatsApp is a 
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social network) and this merger will benefit the consumers by providing them more 
choices in their communication. Furthermore, the collection of user data with aim 
more targeted advertising, is a technique used by every provider and since not all 
valuable data are within Facebook's exclusive control, other social networks will not be 
harmed.91 In any event any privacy-related concerns that result from the merger do 
not fall within the scope of the competition law, but within the EU data protection 
rules.92 The conclusion was that competition is unlikely to be negatively affected by 
the merger of these services. 93  
However, two years later, the Commission is considering to revoke its approval 
ďeĐause FaĐeďook͛s Ŷeǁ pƌiǀaĐǇ ƌules should ďe eǆaŵiŶed foƌ ďƌeaĐh of EU aŶti-
competition laws.94 It seems that the new privacy policy allows WhatsApp to directly 
integrate some user data with Facebook, something that was not happening till August 
2016.95 EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, is under the suspicion that 
FaĐeďook is aďusiŶg its doŵiŶaŶt positioŶ oŶ the ŵaƌket ďǇ ŵatĐhiŶg its useƌs͛ 
accounts ǁith useƌs͛ ŵoďile Ŷuŵďeƌs of WhatsApp aŶd gatheƌiŶg data iŶ oƌdeƌ to use 
them to damage rivals.96 The fact is that Facebook suddenly started collecting 
WhatsApp data in September 2016 and using it for advertisements despite assurances 
at the time that it was ďought, that eǀeƌǇoŶe͛s data ǁould ƌeŵaiŶ eŶtiƌelǇ pƌiǀate. The 
company alleged that this helps improve the messaging platform and provide more 
targeted ads to users.97  
However, during the investigation before the acquisition, Facebook had given 
some assurances about the use of data that the Commission believes might be 
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misleading after all now that Facebook acts differently, and that is why it reopened the 
case.98 
Facebook has to defend itself from these accusations and prove that data 
gathering is not likely to harm competition. In November, it was forced to stop sharing 
WhatsApp user data until the appropriate legal protections can be assured, after 
warning from the DG Competition and it is obliged to give some clear explanations till 
the end of January.99 Otherwise its behavior could be penalized and a fine reaching 
up to 1 percent of its turnover, about $179.3 million, will be imposed.100 Legal 
researchers characterize this case as the first attempt by a European Competition 
Authority to integrate data protection interests into competition analysis.101 
 
3.4 TomTom - Tele Atlas merger 
 
In 2007 TomTom, the largest car navigation systems maker in Europe, agreed 
to buy map-data supplier Tele Atlas. Tele Atlas provides data that goes into the maps 
displayed on ToŵToŵ͛s peƌsoŶal ŶaǀigatioŶ sǇsteŵ. As it was expected, the 
combination of the two Dutch companies might transform the dynamics of the 
market.102 This feaƌ deƌiǀes fƌoŵ ToŵToŵ͛s ǁill to eǆploit data gatheƌed fƌoŵ Tele 
Atlas.  It claimed that data represents one of the most expensive and important 
components in the navigation solution and it would be used to provide new and better 
products and more qualified services to users.103 However the European Commission 
had to investigate this merger in case that the use of these data might harm 
competition.  
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The access by TomTom to confidential information supplied by customers to 
Tele Atlas ŵaǇ pƌoǀide a ǁeapoŶ agaiŶst ƌiǀals, ďut ToŵToŵ͛s Đoŵpetitoƌs ŵight 
choose not to purchase maps from it anymore and this will definitely give a head start 
to NAVTEQ, which is the number one competitor of Tele Atlas. This means that the 
competition might be strengthened after all with TomTom and NAVTEQ trying to 
produce more qualified products in lower prices. Finally, the Commission reached the 
conclusion that the competitive advantage TomTom had gained, did not give rise to 
competition concerns and it was compatible with the European Economic Area 
agreement. 
 
3.5 IMS health case 
 
͞IM“ Health ǀ. NDC Health͟ is another famous competition case involving 
abuse of dominant position through the use of data. IMS Health was the dominant 
provider of data on sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany.  It was basically 
providing reports informing pharmaceutical companies on regional sales of their 
products. The dispute started in 2000, when IMS refused to license its copyrighted 
structure to its competitor, NDC Health, and as it was expected it was accused for 
abuse of dominant position.104 
The interim measure ordered by the European Commission was obliging IMS to 
not exclude any of the undertakings in the relevant market from using its structure of 
data. The Commission justified its decision by arguing that IMS had abused its 
dominant position by failing to license what had become an indispensable industry 
standard.105 The curious thing happened 2 years later when the Commission withdrew 
this decision. This case was left open and the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main had no 
other choice but to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. And as the dominance of IMS 
had already been detected, the only question left unanswered was whether IMS was 
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committing a breach of 102 TFEU, namely, abusing its dominant position by refusing to 
license the use of its structure to NDC.106 
The ECJ gave its final ruling in the long-lasting litigation opposing in 2004. It did 
Ŷot seeŵ to aspiƌe the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s aspeĐt oŶ that ŵatteƌ aŶd ǁas Ŷot so 
convinced to characterize this case as a breach in competition. The protection of 
intellectual property and the economic freedom of IMS were parameters that also had 
to be taken into account and weigh the pros and cons compared to a possible damage 
to competition. Forced sharing data may lessen the incentives for investment and even 
facilitate collusion.
107
 
ECJ stated that determinant factor in order to classify a behavior as abuse of 
dominant position through the denial of providing data, is whether the data at issue 
are indispensable to an undertaking in order to carry on its business in the relevant 
market. Besides article 102 TFEU does not oblige a company to share its own data with 
competitors and if not, it does not imply that this constitutes an abuse. Another 
question that had to be answered is whether this denial to share data, makes it 
impossible or unreasonably difficult for NDC to operate.108 If the answer is positive 
then it will possibly be an abuse of dominant position with anti-competitive effects. A 
third issue that needs to be clarified in order to determine a behavior as abusive, is if 
the refusal to license prevents innovation through the manufacturing of a new 
product, for which there is a consumer demand109 and if yes, then there is again a 
chance of abusive practice. To conclude, ECJ did not provide with clear answers but it 
seems that its attitude is towards the aspect that many things should be measured 
carefully before accusing a firm for breaching 102 TFEU.  
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3.6 Observations and comments 
 
All the above cases have attracted much attention and emphasis has been 
given to the processes of data collection, the purpose it serves and how this might 
harm competition under certain circumstances. In the online market, data have 
become the number one necessary source of power, because it is the only way to 
improve products, services and recommendations for the users. Furthermore, the 
Commission acknowledged that data gathering can also help publishers and 
advertisers in order to provide more targeted ads. So, it seems that this is a profitable 
situation for all players in the market. The companies increase their sales, the 
advertisements reach the appropriate audience and the customers are satisfied by the 
results and enjoy innovative products. 
On the other hand, data gathering can shape competition and transform the 
relevant market beyond imagination. Do users really have some kind of profit from this 
process or they are just the financial victims of a situation of distorted competition 
that is the outcome of the constant battle between companies? It is true that data in 
digital ŵaƌkets ĐaŶ eŶhaŶĐe a ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ŵaƌket poǁeƌ aŶd if that ĐoŵpaŶǇ alƌeadǇ 
possesses a dominant position, then data may double or triple that power, leading 
gradually its competitors out of the market arena.  
Data are generally considered non-rival goods, meaning that the fact that 
someone uses them does not prohibit others from doing the same. This is happening 
because personal data are given freely by the users to multiple undertakings that 
operate online. So, in the end there is no exclusivity in the data sector.110  This does 
not mean however that every new entrant in the market has the same chances to 
consolidate its dominance and find the strength to compete with its rivals, because the 
preexisting undertakings have already a great volume of data at their disposal. The 
competitive disadvantage is bigger when a new undertaking in the market encounters 
dominant players. Besides, a dominant firm always enjoys a position of economic 
strength which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained on 
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the relevant market, and that is why the EE is always concerned about these cases and 
monitors their acts and investments closely. 
 
 
It has been made clear that there is a common ground shared by competition 
law and data protection law. Yet their major difference from an EU perspective, that 
defines their course and also their interaction, is that the legal framework of 
competition law was established many years prior to that of data protection. Despite 
the existence of this difference that make those two areas distinct, they seem to be 
united under their common characteristics. The first one is that they both pursue 
market integration and the second one is that they have a common concern for the 
consumer welfare and guarantee of his economic freedom.111 
Through this paper however we have the opportunity to observe this nascent 
field of law, that of data protection, and its interaction with competition, through 
various cases that triggered this debate. From a competitive point of view, data 
gathering deserves special attention, so as to control potential abusive behavior. In the 
aftermath of the merger cases that we analyzed, there is another danger that emerges 
from combined data and that is price discrimination. It is true that major data 
collectors like Google and Facebook, usually offer different deals to users according to 
their needs and budget. That technique which is facilitated by data collection is 
obviously harmful for competition because in the end many consumers purchase the 
same object in very high prices. On the other hand, there are positive effects for 
consumers who receive lower prices and for businesses which please their customers, 
improve their production and generate significant profit.  Recording the weighting rate 
of damage and benefit in such cases is impossible and labeling a price discrimination as 
positive or negative seems quite complicate. That is why antitrust regulators are 
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mostly unwilling to admit that price discrimination stemming from data gathering is 
anticompetitive.112 
Another crucial topic of discussion is whether the barriers to entry that derive 
from data collection are truly so high that destroy competition. The online reality 
shows otherwise. Newcomers are making their appearance constantly and seem to 
thrive, even though they have to confront dominant players like Google. Anyway, if we 
retrace the last decades of the online world we will possibly find out that new entrants 
come and go and players that once possessed a dominant place no longer exist. So, we 
deduce that in this relentlessly evolving playground, everyone has a chance to succeed 
or fail despite the pressure from competitors. In the end, it is the users that have the 
last say and can easily switch from one service provider to another.  
There is also a belief that data protection law has also been acting as an 
͚eǆteƌŶal ĐoŶstƌaiŶt͛ oŶ ĐoŵpetitioŶ laǁ. CoŵpetitioŶ authoƌities, ǁhiĐh aƌe ďouŶd to 
respect data protection, sometimes are obliged to allow restrictions in the competition 
field, so as to guarantee the effectiveness of that fundamental right. This is happening 
because the fundamental right of data protection takes precedence and excludes the 
application of competition law if necessary.113 
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The digital economy is a new thriving place where EU rules on data protection 
and competition apply as well. It offers various advantages for its citizens by protecting 
the internal market and the enforcement of the above-mentioned principles. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine how data protection can influence the 
interpretation and enforcement of competition law.  
Merger control remains a testing ground for the normative influence of data 
protection on competition law. Not every concentration is suspicious, yet every single 
one has to be scrutinized in order to trace possible creation or strengthening of 
dominant positions. The concentrations must of course abide by the European 
statutory rules for competition and be approved by the Commission in order to avoid 
possible contraventions. 
The Facebook/WhatsApp case gave the Commission the opportunity to 
examine mergers from a combined competition and data protection perspective which 
made the whole situation very complicated. Yet, the market power resulting from the 
Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition did not raise particular concerns for the Commission. 
The decisive factor was that the parties could not be considered close competitors in 
the relevant market of consumer communication services. Furthermore, more 
targeted advertising sounds more like a progressive change beneficial for the 
consumers and advertising companies, than destructive for the competitors, because it 
provided the opportunity of access to more relevant data. In the end, the 
concentration was assessed as complying with the abovementioned competition rules.  
In the Google – DoubleClick merger the Commission once again reached the 
conclusion that it poses no threat to competition because the two merging companies 
operate in different parts of the online advertising world. Although at first glance, this 
merger had all the characteristics to be presumed as harmful to competition and 
consumers, in the end we were mistaken to believe so. So, once again the relevant 
market was the decisive factor.  
5.  General approach and results of the research 
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It is obvious that both Google and DoubleClick are active in the "online 
advertising" industry, but whereas Google is present in the market for the provision of 
online advertising space, DoubleClick merely sells tools that provide display ad serving 
functionality. This indicates that the merging companies are not direct competitors. 
Even on the presumption that DoubleClick would develop into a key competitor of 
Google, detrimental effect to competition cannot be proven based on the elimination 
of a possible future competitor. A sufficient competitive pressure will anyway be 
maintained because of the existence of many other dominant undertakings.  
Finally, the crucial matter of combination of customer provided data has the 
potential to allow the merged entity to achieve a position that could not be matched 
by its competitors. However, the two most dominant players, Microsoft and Yahoo! 
also run search engines and offer ad serving, gathering in that way the same amount of 
data as Google. In the end, ǁe ĐaŶŶot aƌgue that Google͛s plaĐe ǁould be enhanced in 
a way that it would create a significant impediment to competition, based merely on 
the fact of combination of its assets with those of DoubleClick.114 
When TomTom decided to acquire Tele Atlas there were once again suspicions 
that competition might be harmed by the exploitation of combined data from the two 
undertakings. The likelihood of competitive destruction would be due to the possibility 
of TomTom being able to profitably increase the price charged to consumers and 
simultaneously offeƌ loǁeƌ ƋualitǇ. As a ƌesult, the poteŶtial ƌiǀals͛ aĐĐess to ŵaƌket 
would be hampered and the already existing companies would face difficulties and 
lack of incentive trying to compete. 
It has been proven though, that barriers to entry are low and new players can 
enter the relevant market of navigation software whenever they want. Moreover, 
coordination between the two remaining dominant players, Tele Atlas and NAVTEQ 
seems rather impossible to happen. The Commission reached the conclusion that 
these companies cannot form a collusive agreement and coordinate their prices, since 
they could not deter and monitor deviations from the terms of coordination and also 
there is no transparency on map database prices. So, the imminent danger, which is 
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data accumulation through concentration, that threatens competition becomes less 
harmful if the matter is investigated properly.115  
Because in the end it is not so simple to accuse a company and impede a 
scheduled merger or acquisition, based merely on the possibility that the effect on 
competition will be detrimental. Recent cases of concentration have shown that 
although the ĐoŵpetitioŶ authoƌities ǁeƌe alaƌŵed ďǇ ƌiǀals͛ ĐoŵplaiŶts aŶd haǀe 
proceeded to the most exhausting investigation in order to protect the market and the 
consumers, they were not capable of finding enough evidence to prevent it. This is 
happeŶiŶg ďeĐause ǁe teŶd to peƌĐeiǀe Đoŵpetitoƌs͛ ŵoǀes as aĐts ǁith oŶlǇ puƌpose 
the exclusion of their rivals from the market. Although this is quite close to their true 
motives, it does not mean that they seek to distort competition or that they are 
capable of succeeding into it. Because in order for a merged entity to exploit combined 
data with the purpose of distorting competition, many additional conditions have to be 
met. 
The increased collection, processing and commercial use of data will pave the 
way to success for online companies. Accumulation of substantial amounts of them, 
combination of data through a merger and all similar methods of acquiring them is a 
smart strategy which alarms all the rival undertakings and the competition authorities 
as well. The other undertakings are concerned about their customers and profits, 
ǁheƌeas EU Đaƌes aďout its ĐitizeŶs͛ ǁelfaƌe aŶd that poteŶtial eŶtƌaŶts to ŵaƌket have 
a chance to be part of it and not excluded because of the existence of dominant 
players. Yet, it is not easy to decide whether a company or two merging companies 
combining their data will harm competition. 
Many other factors must be taken into account. Firstly, we have to define the 
relevant market and the actual position of the merging entities. Maybe in the end we 
reach the conclusion that they are not competitors. Moreover, the dynamic of the 
market will be altered after a concentration in an unpredictable way, meaning that 
nobody can tell for sure that the other players will be put in a difficult position. 
Perhaps the merger could allow the competitors to compete in a more effective way 
and the consumers to gain huge benefits from new improved services and innovative 
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products. Eventually, there might be no restriction to competition as we suspected in 
the beginning. As for huge amounts of data collected by a dominant firm that refuses 
to share them with its competitors, we cannot argue that this action raises barriers to 
entry and distorts competition, based merely on that fact. Refusal to supply may have 
anti-competitive effects if the only purpose of keeping these data for itself is in order 
to foreclose the competitors from an essential business asset. Otherwise, if there is 
compliance with data protection rules and the data are used for the purpose they 
were originally collected, the company cannot be accused for trying to protect its 
special interests by denying to share something that will give it the desired advantage 
against its rivals.116 
Furthermore, collecting large volumes of data is not proof that they are 
indispensable in order to compete in the market. Also, it is not a sign that the company 
which follows this tactic gains a competitive advantage or that it will use them as a 
weapon and abuse its dominant position. We should keep in mind that it is the volume 
of customers which are truly indicative of market power, not the personal data 
itself.117 It seems that the tendency when assessing competition cases that involve the 
processing of personal data, is to investigate in depth but also take into account all the 
relevant factors before reaching a conclusion. 
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So far, there have been raised concerns about the way companies gather and 
exploit personal data and big data. However, it has not been clarified yet, whether the 
combination of these data can have implications on competition as well. The growing 
number of cases on this subject the last few decades, have triggered the European 
Commission into investigating many parameters of this possible interplay between the 
two sectors of data protection and competition law. This dissertation intends to 
contribute to the European Union debate of whether data accumulation by companies 
is raising the possibility of distortion to competition. It analyzes the notions of big data 
and personal data and the legal framework, by focusing especially in the General Data 
Protection Regulation. Furthermore, this paper aims at providing a clear image of the 
anti-competitive conducts, such as distribution agreements and mergers. As powerful 
undertakings are able to alter the rules of the market and create barriers to entry, we 
should seek what measures must be taken in order to avoid impediments on 
competition. Finally, it adopts a case-based approach by referring to the most 
interesting and famous cases that concerned the European Commission from a 
competition standpoint and their impact on the attitude towards the relevant practice 
in the EU. The antitrust investigations have shown that each case is unique and data 
gathering operations that arise from concentrations and other processes, might not be 
harmful for competition after all, if they are examined in a more general context. From 
the above discussion, it is clear that the theories of competition harm, although they 
can be proven real, they presuppose increased market power and a mass of data 
unmatched and inaccessible by competitors. The challenge is to shed more light over 
this subject in order to reduce the current uncertainties by further investigation and 
focused attention to the strategical corporate moves that threaten to distort 
competition. 
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Big Data 
For a better understanding of this term there is a definition by John Bruner. He 
said that ͞Big Data is the result of collectiŶg iŶforŵatioŶ at its ŵost graŶular 
level͟. It is not easy to trace the origins of the recently appeared term of Big 
Data, which was added in the Oxford Dictionary in 2013. Big Data, is a 
technological innovation in distributed computing, which has the potential to 
help companies improve operations and make faster, more intelligent decisions. 
Big Data is actually a massive volume of data stored, analyzed and used by 
ĐoŵpaŶies to iŶĐƌease ƌeǀeŶues ďǇ ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg the Đustoŵeƌ͛s Ŷeeds 
and thus applying more targeted advertising or producing more qualified 
pƌoduĐts. NoǁadaǇs a ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s opeƌatioŶs aƌe ŶeĐessaƌilǇ ďased oŶ the 
collection of this kind of data. 
The pƌoďleŵ is that ǁe haǀe Đƌeated a digital soĐietǇ that Ŷeeds ͞digital 
ǀalues͟ iŶ oƌdeƌ to fuŶĐtioŶ pƌopeƌlǇ. OŶ the oŶe haŶd, data-driven results can 
give us better predictions in various sectors, but on the other hand lack rules to 
govern new flows, new uses, and new decisions derived from that data. 
Eventually we must establish laws that will regulate the costs, without depriving 
the companies and their customers from the benefits. 
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
European Union (EU) 
Directorate General (DG) 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Treaty for the Function of the European Union (TFEU) 
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